Concerned Parents of Step-Children, On Behalf of their Members and All Others Similarly Situated, and Janice Everill, Ellen Lehwalder and Linda Rey, On Behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Anthony Mitchell, Individually:
and In His Capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Social Services,: and Keith Oram, Individually and In His Capacity as Director of the office of assistance Payments Administration : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Concerned Parents of Step-Children, On Behalf of
their Members and All Others Similarly Situated,
and Janice Everill, Ellen Lehwalder and Linda Rey,
On Behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated v. Anthony Mitchell, Individually: and In
His Capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,: and Keith Oram,
Individually and In His Capacity as Director of the
office of assistance Payments Administration : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICE; Attorneys for Appellants PAUL M. TINKER, SHARON PEACOCK;
Attorneys for Respondents
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Everill v. Mitchell, No. 16870 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2121
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEP-
CHILDREN, on behalf of their 
members and all others simi-
larly situated, and JANICE 
EVERILL, ELLEN LEHWALDER and 
LINDA REY, on behalf of them-
selves and all others simi-
' larly situated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ANTHONY MITCHELL, individually: 
and in his capacity as Execu- : 
tive Director of the Utah 
Department of Social Services,: 
and KEITH ORAM, individually 
and in his capacity as Dir-
ector of the Office of Assist-: 
ance Payments Administration, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 16870 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING. 
PAUL M. TINKER 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorneys General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By BRUCE PLENK 
352 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
2 8 1980 
---. , ......... ,~.,, . ..:. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE . . ................................. . 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL............................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
ARGUMEtJT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
S.B. 54 IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ACT AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
AND CANNOT BE USED TO TER-
MINATE WELFARE BENEFITS ........... . 
RESPONDENTS' NOTICE OF 
MAY 10, 1979, VIOLATED 
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) 
IN THAT IT FAILED TO PRO-
VIDE APPELLANTS WITH 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE 
PROPOSED ELIMINATION OF 
BENEFITS .......................... . 
RESPONDENTS' "NOTICE OF 
AGENCY ACTION" DELETING 
THE AFDC-STEPCHILDREN'S 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM VIOLATED 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULE-MAKING ACT ................... . 
3 
13 
27 
CONCLUSION .................................... · · · · . . . . . 32 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Adams v. Professional Practices Conunission, 524 
P.2d 932, (Okla. 1974) ...•.......... · · · .. · · · · · • · · · · 
Application of Slochowsky, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 
342 N.Y. S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1973) ........... . 
Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 
(1st Cir. 1977) .................... · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · 
Becker v. Blum, 464 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) .....••...................................... 
Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 799 
(1st Cir. 1976) .................................. . 
Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978) .................................. · · .. ·. · 
Bunting v. Juras, 11 Or. App. 297, 502 P.2d 607 
(Ore. Ct. App. 1972) ............................. . 
Burke v. Children's Service Division, 26 Or. App. 
145, 552 P.2d 592 (Ct. App. 1976) ................ . 
Burlingame v. Schmidt, 368 F. Supp. 429 
( E. D. Wis . 19 7 3 ) .•...•..••••.•••.•..••••••.••••••• 
Campos v. Mitchell, (D. Utah, March 10, 1980) ......... . 
City of New York v. Diamond~ 379 F. Supp. 503 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) .................................. . 
Curtis v. Page, No. 78-732 '(N.D. Fla. 
Apr. 13, 1978) .....•........•..................... 
Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.) 
aff'd. 409 U.S. 1070 (1972) ...................... . 
Hatch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 
1954) ............................................ . 
Kelly v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. 
Cal. 1972.) ..•...•..•••.••......•••.....••••.•••.•. 
ii 
Page 
29 
8 
13 
16t19 
11 
18 
8,10 
29 
23 
26 
31 
16, 18 
1. I 8 I 9 I •' 
30,31 
30 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) .................... . 4,14 
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) .................. . 7,11,12 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 566 
P.2d 1249 (Utah 1977) ............................ . 11 
McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 
P.2d 726 (1963) .................................. . 11 
McLernore v. Welfare Division of Dept. of Hurn. Res., 
551 P. 2d 1101 (Nev. 1976) ........................ . 4 
New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 
413 U.S. 405 (1973) .............................. . 11 
Nolan v. deBaca, 603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979) ........ . 4 
Quirn v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978) ................. . 4 
Stenson v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ..... 25 
Turner v. Walsh, 435 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1977), 
aff'd 524 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1978) ............... . 20 
Viverito v. Smith, 421 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) ............................................ . 20 
Willard v. State Dept. of Soc. and Health Services, 
592 P. 2d 1103 (Wash. 1979) ....................... . 4 
Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973) ...................... ·. · · · · · · · · · ·. · .. · · 22,23 
Statutes and Regulations 
5 u.s.c. §553.......................................... 30 
42 u.s.c. §601 et seq.................................. 2,8 
42 u.s.c. §602 (a) (10).................................. 4 
42 u.s.c. §606......................................... '1,5 
iii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 u.s.c. §607 ...............................•......... 
Utah Code Ann. §15-2-1 ................................ . 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-17.2 ............................. . 
Utah Code Ann. §30-4-1 ................................ . 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46-1 .................•.............. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46-5 ..............................•. 
Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-4.1 .............................• 
§78-45-4.2 ..........................•... 
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) .•.•...•....•......••.•.••••.•.•.•. 
45 C.F.R. §233.90 ..............•.•......•••............ 
iv 
5 
10 
11 
9 
3,27 
-·· 
-: 
27, 2E 
31 
9 ,11, 
--
--9 
13 ,14 
17'19 
21, 22 
4' 5 '6 
·-
12, 13 .. 
-· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEP-
CHILDREN, on behalf of their 
members and all others simi-
larly situated, and JANICE 
EVERILL, ELLEN LEI-H\TALDER and 
LINDA REY, on behalf of them-
selves and all others simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ANTHONY MITCHELL, individually: 
and in his capacity as Execu- : 
tive Director of the Utah 
Department of Social Services,: 
and KEITH ORAM, individually 
and in his capacity as Dir-
ector of the Office of Assist-: 
ance Payments Administration, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16870 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James 
S. Sawaya ~residing. Based on Stipulated facts, the District 
Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and held that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants had not violated state or federal statutes or 
regulations in terminating part of the state's welfare 
program. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is 
a state administered welfare program authorized under the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §601 et seq.) and funded by 
both state and federal governments which provides public 
assistance to families with children who are 11 deprived of 
parental support." Federal regulations require this depri-
vation be determined only in relation to a child's natural 
or adoptive parent unless state law imposes an identical 
support requirement on stepparents. The State of Utah has 
paid benefits to Appellants Everill, Lehwalder, and Rey but 
stopped these payments in May, 1979. This termination was 
based on Respondents' policy change, implemented in May, 
1979, which eliminated all families with stepparents from 
Utah's AFDC program. This change was implemented in response 
to S.B. 54 (1979), R 96-98, and deletion of funds for this 
portion of the AFDC p:i;-ogram by the ·19 79 Utah Legislature. 
Appellants were notified of the termination of assistance by 
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a notice sent May 10, 1979, R. 102. Respondents implemented 
this policy change by promulgating an emergency rule adoption 
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rule-Making Act, U.C.A. 
§63-46-1 et seq., R. 103. The United States Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has disapproved of the 
policy change. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
S.B. 54 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
AND CANNOT BE USED TO TERMINATE WELFARE 
BENEFITS. 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program is a joint federal-state welfare program. Under the 
AFDC program, Utah receives federal matching funds for cash 
assistance provided to needy dependent children and the 
relatives who are caring for them. In return for the 
federal matching funds Utah must comply with federal con-
ditions attached to the receipt of those funds. 
The general issue in this case is whether or not 
Plaintiffs' children qualify as "dependent children" as 
defined in the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. §606, and the HEW 
-3-
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regulations, 45 C.F.R. §233.90. If so, Utah is required by 
42 u.s.c. §602(a) (10) and the Supremacy Clause to provide 
them with AFDC benefits. 
A participating state may not deny aid to persons 
who ~ome within the federal standard of eligibility established 
by those regulations, Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978), 
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), Nolan v. deBaca, 
603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979). State courts have also 
recognized this principle, see Willard v. State, Dept. of 
Soc. and Health Services, 592 P.2d 1103 (Wash. 1979) and 
McLemore v. Welfare Division of Dept. of Hum. Res., 551 
P.2d 1101 (Nev. 1976). The question then becomes whether 
children in Utah living in homes with a stepparent are 
eligible for AFDC benefits under the federal standards. 
There are two basic elements to the definition of 
a "dependent child." First a child must be needy; that is, 
the child's income must be less than Utah has determined is 
necessary for the child's needs. ~efendant can not challenge 
the fact that Plaintiffs' children are needy. All were 
receiving AFDC prior to the events at issue in this case and 
their benefits were not terminated because of a determination 
that they were no longer needy. 
-4--
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The second element is that a child must be "deprived 
of parental support or care" by reason of a parent's death, 
continued absence, or physical or mental incapacity, 42 
u.s;c. §606, or unemployment, 42 u.s.c. §607. Under the 
statute and the HEW regulations, a child meets this require-
ment when there is only one "parent 11 in the home or when 
there are two 11 par en ts 11 in the home and one or both are · 
incapacitated or unemployed. 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a), (c) (1) (i). 
The HEW regulations defihe which persons a state 
may treat as a "parent" in deter:rnining whether this 11 deprivation" 
requirement is met. They provide that a "parent 11 means a 
natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a stepparent who 
... is ceremonially married to the child's 
natural or adoptive parent and is legally 
obligated to support the child under State 
law of general applicability which re-
auires stepparents to support stepchildren 
to the same extent that natural or adoptive 
parents are required to support their 
children. Under this requirement, the 
inclusion in the family, or the presence 
in the home, of a "substitute parent" or 
"man-in-the-house" or any individual other 
than one described in this paragraph is 
not an acceptable basis for a finding of 
ineligibility or for assuming the avail-
ability of income by the State; nor may the 
State agency prorate or otherwise reduce 
the money amount for any need item included 
in the standard on the basis of assumed 
contributions from nonlegally responsible 
individuals living in the household. In 
-5-
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establishing financial eligibility and 
the amount of the assistance payment, only 
such net income as is actually available for 
current use on a regular basis will be con-
sidered, and the income only of the parent 
described in the first sentence of this 
paragraph will be considered available for 
children in the household in the absence 
of proof of actual contributions. 
45 C.F.R. §233.90 (a). (emphasis added) 
The Appellants' children in this case are children 
who are living with one natural parent and a stepparent. It 
is conceded by Respondents that at least until May, 1979 
stepparents in Utah could not be treated as parents under 
the HEW regulations. The children therefore met the depri-
vation requirement because there was only one "parent" 
living with them. 
Respondents terminated the children's benefits on 
May 31, 1979 on the basis that as a result of a change in 
state law stepparents in Utah may now be treated as "parents" 
under these regulations. 
Appellants show below that stepparents in Utah may 
not be treated as "parents" under the HEW regulations and 
that even if they may be, that the children may still meet 
the "deprivation" requirement on the basis that one of their 
"parents" is incapacitated or unemployed. 
-6-
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HEW has interpreted the above regulation and 
utilized what has become known as the "tri-partite test" to 
evaluate State laws to determine whether they meet the 
"general applicability" and '!co-extensiveness" tests of the 
r~gulations. This test was originally set out in the HEW 
Amicus Curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Lewis v. 
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). HEW has continued this analysis 
to the present day. See letter to Defendant Mitchell from 
Patricia J. Livers, Acting HEW Regional Commissioner dated 
June 8, 1979. Appendix 1. This test requires that the 
stepparent support obligation be 
1. a duty of general applicability; 
2. one in which he could be compelled by 
court order to fulfill even after he 
has deserted or abandoned the house-
hold; and 
3. one which must exist regardless of 
whether the children would otherwise 
receive AFDC payments. 
If the state statute does not meet all of these three 
requirements, the stepparent cannot be considered a "parent" 
for purposes of determining the child's "deprivation." 
It is crucial to note that this test is not a test 
of constitutionality. A statute which is constitutional 
still may not comply with the HEW regulations. The effect, 
of course, is that stepparents cannot be considered "parents" 
for purposes of welfare determinations. As one court stated: 
-7--
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[T]here is no need to generally declare 
Public Law No. 93 invalid. However, to 
the extent Public Law No. 93 and Public 
Law No. 275 are inconsistent with federal 
regulations, they may not be used as the 
vehicle to terminate or reduce AFDC pay-
ments so long as the State of Indiana shall 
participate in the AFDC program under the 
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. 
§601 et seq, as Indiana has statutorily 
agreea-to do .... Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 
F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd. 
409 U.S. 1070 (1972). 
Numerous state and federal courts have applied 
this three-part test and in all cases but two have found 
state law insufficient to meet the HEW regulations. ~he 
first and third parts of the test above require the law to 
be one of 11 general applicability" and not limited to receipt 
of welfare. This provision has been relied on to invalidate 
action taken by several states to terminate welfare payments 
to families with stepparents. This language has generally 
been interpreted to mean that statutes requiring step-
parents to support their stepchildren only when they would 
otherwise become "publj,.c wards" or eligible for welfare are 
invalid under 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a). Gaither v. Sterrett, 
supra. Application of Slochowsky, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 342 
N.Y.S. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Bunting v. Juras, 
502 P.2d 607 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972). 
-8-
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The second aspect of the HEW test requires that 
the stepparent's liability be enforceable by court order 
after abandonment or desertion until a divorce takes place. 
This test has been referred to as a test of ~coextensive­
ness", requiring the stepparent be liable to the same extent 
as is a natural or adoptive parent for the support of a 
child. The court in Gaither v. Sterrett, found the Indiana 
statute defective in this area, since it required only 
stepfathers (not stepmothers) to support their stepchildren 
while residing with them (not after a separation) . In 
comparing the support obligations of stepfathers under this 
statute with that imposed by law on natural and adoptive 
parents, the court found the statute inconsistent with the 
federal regulations. 346 F. Supp. at 1101. 
S.B. 54 fails to meet this three-pronged test. 
The first and clearest difference between the support obliga-
tion of stepparents and that of natural parents is in duration. 
A stepparent may terminate the obligation by simply separating 
from his or her spouse and filing for divorce. U.C.A. §78-45-4.1. 
This is directly contrary to the provisions for temporary 
support embodied in U.C.A. §30-4-1 et seq. 
The second difference is in the nature of the 
liability. Stepparents may sue to recover their support 
payments, U.C.A. §78-45-4.2, while natural and adoptive 
-9-
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parents have no such surety to fall back on. ~gain, a clear 
difference in support obligations between stepparents and 
natural or adoptive parents. 
Third, S.B. 54 provides that a stepparent shall 
support a stepchild and defines child in this context as 11 a 
son or daughter under the age of 18 years". Section 1. It 
seems clear that the support obligation ends when the step-
child reaches 18. This however is not true for natural or 
adoptive parents who may be liable for the support of their 
children until age 21, if ordered by a court in a divorce 
action. U.C.A. §15-2-1 (as amended 1975). Since the divorce 
statute provides no basis for assessing support for step-
children and S.B. 54 specifically excludes stepparent support 
obligations after a separation connected with a divorce, the 
same problem which arose in Oregon in the Sunting case, 
supra, presents itself to this Court: the law under considera-
tion is simply not a law of "general applicability." The 
fact that students in Utah who are between 18 and 21 can 
receive welfare yet are not entitled to support from their 
stepparents in Utah, as in Oregon, is a further indicator 
that S.B. 54 is not a law of general applicability. 
Fourth, the declaration that "the support obliga-
tion shall be as if the marriage had never taken place 11 
appears to conflict with the support obligation that may be 
-10-
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imposed in the annulment context, U.C.A. §30-1-17.2, where 
the court may order temporary or permanent support and 
maintenance as it determines is equitable. 
Finally, it appears that a possible interpretation 
of, U.C.A. §78-45-4.1 would allow a stepparent to avoid 
liability for support due and owing from a period of separa-
tion prior to filing for a divorce or a legal separation. 
This three-part test and the underlying analysis 
should be given great weight by this court. In Lewis v. 
Martin, the source of the test, the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that the court would "give HEW the deference due the 
agency charged with the administration of the [Social 
Security] Act." 397 U.S. at 559. In fact the Suoreme Court 
has even gone further in its deference to the appropriate 
administrative agency, stating in New York State Dept. of 
Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973) that 
"the construction of a statute by those charged with its 
execution should be followed unless there are compelling 
indications that it is wrong ... " This deferral to the 
expertise of the agency may be even greater in interpreting 
its own regulations. See Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 
799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976). Utah has adopted a similar rule. 
McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 
(1963); Lockheed J\ .. ircraft Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 
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566 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 1977). In the present case the 
agency interpretation of the Social Security Act and its own 
rules coincides with the arguments of Appellants and should 
be adopted by this court. 
This agency interpretation is found in the June 8, 
1979 and August 3, 1979 letters to ?.espondent Mitchell from 
Acting HEW Regional Commissioner Patricia Livers, attached 
as Appendices 1 and 2. In those letters, REW states why the 
Respondents have violated applicable federal regulations and 
the "tripartite test" of Lewis v .. Martin. 
In fact, Respondents concede that the terms of 
U.C.A. §78-45-4.1 did not meet the requirements of 45 C.f.R. 
233.90(a). This section was recently amended by the 1980 
Utah Legislature to remove the language which restricted 
stepparent support liability. This amendment to the statute, 
urged by Respondents on the Legislature as necessary to 
avoid a cut-off in federal funding for welfare programs, 
points up even further the deficiencies in the law prior to 
its amendment. See Appendix 3 for text of 1980 changes. 
The issues raised in this appeal are certainly ~ot moot, 
however, since over 1800 families continue to be deprived of 
welfare assistance as a result of S.B. 54. 
-12-
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Respondents argue that Archibald v. Whaland, 
555 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1977) is helpful in analyzing the 
present case. That case is one of only two cases ever 
decided that upheld a state procedure as consistent with the 
requirements of 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a). That case presented a 
rather different issue for the court: whether exclusion of 
stepchildren from the New Hampshire criminal non-support 
statutes violated the "coextensiveness'' test. The court 
held that this difference was de minimus and that the test 
was otherwise satisfied. Of critical significance in that 
case as well is the court's reliance on the HEW regional 
office analysis of the New Hampshire statute, finding it to 
be compatible with federal regulations. By contrast, as 
illustrated above, the HEW regional office covering Utah has 
not only not approved the state law but has initiated 
sanctions against the state for the actions giving rise to 
this case. This Court should adopt the HEW analysis, find 
S.B. 54 incompatible with federal regulations and hold, as 
did the Gaither court, that this statute "may not be used as 
the vehicle to terminate or reduce AFDC payments". 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' NOTICE OF MAY 10, 1979, 
VIOLATED 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) 
IN THAT IT FAILED TO PROVIDE APPEL-
LANTS WITH ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE 
PROPOSED ELIMINATION OF BENEFITS. 
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1. Controlling Federal Regulations 
Require Respondents to Provide 
AFDC Recipients with Timely and 
Adequate Notice of Proposed Elimi-
nation of Benefits. 
If states choose to participate in the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, they must 
do so in compliance with the provisions of Title IV of the 
Social Security Act and with valid regulations issued by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare governing the 
program. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, (1968). 45 C.F.R. 
§205.lO(a) provides in pertinent parts: 
A State plan under Titles I, IV-A, X, 
XIV, XVI, or XIX of the Social Security 
Act shall provide a system of hearings 
under which: 
(4) In cases of intended action to dis-
continue, terminate, suspend or reduce 
assistance; 
(i) The state or local agency shall give 
timely and adequate notice .... (emphasis 
added) 
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) defines the reauire-
rnents of adequate notice when changes in either state or 
Federal law require automatic grant adjustments for classes 
or recipients. 
-14-
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When changes in either state or Federal law 
require automatic grant adjustments for 
classes of recipients, timelv notice of 
such grant adju~tments shall~be given which 
shall be adequate if it includes (1) a 
statement of the intended action, (2) the 
reasons for such intended action, (3) a 
statement of the specific change in law 
requiring such action, and (4) a state-
ment of the circumstances under which a 
hearing may be obtained and assistance 
continued. (emphasis added) 
Federal regulations thus require Respondents to 
give ti~ely and adequate notice to Appellants of the elimina-
tion of the AFDC benefits. 
2. Respondents' Notice of Intended Action 
Dated May 10, 1979 was Inadequate As 
It Failed to Include A Statement of 
the Specific Change in Law Requiring 
the Action. 
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) provides that notice 
of automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients 
pursuant to a change in state law "shall be adepuate if it 
includes ... a statement of the specific change in law re-
quiring such action." Res?ondents' notice to l'.FDC recirients 
with stepfathers i.n the home dated May 10, 1979, failed to 
include such a statement. The notice merely refers to "a 
change in the Utah law" and gives no specifics at all. 'I'he 
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absence of a statement of the specific change in Utah law 
requiring elimination of AFDC benefits renders the notice 
inadequate under federal law and in and of itself precludes 
termination of benefits until proper notice is given. 
In Becker v. Blum, 464 F. Supp. 152, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978), the court held that a notice to medicaid beneficiaries 
of a requirement of co-Dayment for the purchase of pres-
cription drugs was inadequate because among other things the 
notice did not contain a specific statement of the change of 
law requiring the action. That notice had four full para-
graphs explaining the change in the law in comparison to the 
nearly nonexistent explanation in the present case. Yet, it 
was still inadequate. The court in Curtis v. Page, No. 78-
732 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1978) reached a similar result 
holding the notice defective on the ground there is no 
specific statement of the change in law. A copy of this 
case is attached hereto as Appendix 4. 
3. Respondents' Notice of Intended Action 
Dated May 10, 1979 was Inadequate Since 
it Failed to Include a Statement of the 
Circumstances Under Which a Eearing 
Could be Obtained and Assistance Con-
tinued. 
-16-
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45 C~F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (iii) provides that notice 
of automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients 
pursuant to a change in state law "shall be adequate if it 
includes ... a statement of the circumstances under which a 
hearing may be obtained and assistance continued." De-
fendants' notice dated May 10, 1979 failed to include such a 
statement. The absence of such a statement renders the 
notice inadequate under federal law. 
Adequate notice is required to give recipients the 
opportunity to exercise their right to a hearing and to a 
continuation of benefits pending that hearing. ~hese rights 
are set out in 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (5) and (6): 
(5) An opportunity for a hearing shall be 
granted to ... any recipient who is aggrieved 
by any agency action resulting in suspension, 
reduction, discontinuance or termination of 
assistance. A hearing need not be granted 
with either State or Federal law requires 
automatic grant adjustments for classes of 
reciuients unless the reason for an indi-
vidu~l aopeal is an incorrect grant compu-
tation. (emphasis added) 
(v) The agency may deny or dismiss a re-
quest for a hearing where the sole issue 
is one of state or Federal law requiring 
automatic grant adjustments for classes of 
recipients. 
Yet, if a recipient requests a hearing in a timely 
fashion, 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) provides that: 
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Assistance shall not be suspended, reduced, 
discontinued or terminated, (but is sub-
ject to recovery by the agency if its action 
is sustained), until a decision is rendered 
after a hearing, unless: 
(a) a determination is made at the hearing 
that the sole issue is one of State or 
Federal law or policy, or change in state 
or Federal law and not of incorrect grant 
computation .... §205.10 (a) (6) (A). (emphasis 
added) 
The phrase "incorrect grant computation" has been 
construed hy federal courts to apply to those instances in 
which a recipient challenges the application of the new law 
to his or her individual situation. Budnicki v. Beal, 
450 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
Courts have construed the applicable federal 
regulations to require a notice to recipients of reductions 
of assistance and a statement of the circumstances under 
which a hearing can be obtained even if a state law required 
automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients. See 
e.g. Curtis, supra at 2-3. 
In Budnicki, supra, the court held that a notice 
published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin was inadequate which 
informed recipients of the reduction in the availability of 
orthopedic shoes and shoe accessories under the medical 
assistance programs. The court determined that the re-
duction involved an automatic grant adjustment, yet the 
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recipients were entitled to notice of the availability of a 
pre-reduction hearing under §205.lO(a) (5) since there was a 
possibility, the court speculated, the elimination of the 
orthopedic shoe program would not apply to a number of them 
because of the individual factual questions involved. Since 
the court found that the state violated federal regulations 
in the method of terminating the orthopedic shoe program, 
the court reinstated the program. 450 F. Supp. at 557. 
In Becker, supra, the state provided notice to 
Medicaid recipients of the implementation of a $.50 co-
payment charge per prescription drug. The notice failed to 
include a statement of the circumstances under which a 
hearing could be obtained and assistance continued if a 
timely request for a hearing were made. The court found the 
notice to be inadequate and rejected the state's claim that 
the notice was harmless because it would have no effect on 
the ultimate resolution of the action. 
Defendants maintain that regardless of 
Plaintiffs' right to notice under the 
regulations, the mailing of timely and 
adeauate notice would have had no 
eff~ct on the ultimate resolution of the 
action. This argument fails to take into 
consideration the fact that under certain 
circumstances Plaintiff would be entitled 
under federal regulations to a pre-termina-
tion hearing. Thus 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (5) 
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requires an opportunity for a hearing to 
any applicant "who is aggrieved by any 
agency action resulting in suspension, 
reduction, discontinuance or termination 
of assistance." Although that regulation 
further provides that "[a] hearing need not 
be granted when either State or Federal 
law require automatic grant adjustments 
for classes of recipients," there is an 
exception to this provision where "the 
reason for an individual appeal is in-
correct grant computation." Moreover, at 
a minimum, Plaintiffs have the right to 
have aid continued (subject to recovery) 
pending a determination at a hearing that 
the sole issue is one of state or Federal 
law or policy and not one of incorrect 
grant computation. 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) 
(6) (i) (A). See Viverito v. Smith, 421 F. 
Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
Turner v. Walsh, 435 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. aff 'd 
524 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1978), concerned the validity of a 
notice of reduction of welfare assistance. After enactment 
of a statute requiring a new method of determining AFDC 
benefits, the state sent notices to recipients that their 
AFDC grants would be reduced. The notice attempted to 
inform the recipients that a hearing could be obtained: 
If you feel that this decision is not 
correct, you have 90 days from the date 
of this notice to request a hearing at 
your county Division of Family Services 
office. Any change in the amount of your 
ADC grant or Social Security may effect 
[sic] your eligibility for food stamps. 
Id. at 713. 
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The court reviewed the Federal regulations and concluded: 
Thus, the regulations clearly contemplate 
that if a recipient requests a hearing 
within ten days of the notice, his/her 
benefits will continue at their present 
level until a decision is rendered after 
the hearing, unless at the time of the 
hearing, a determination is made that 
the only issue involved is one of state 
or federal law or policy. In that event, 
the benefits, having continued from the 
date of the notice, would terminate as of 
the date of the hearing. In no event--
given a hearing request within 10 days 
of notice raising an alleged error in 
grant computation--do the regulations 
contemplate termination of benefits orior 
to the hearing. Id. at 714. 
The court held that the "notice clearly is deficient." 
Unquestionably, this notice contains no 
mention of the circumstances under which 
assistance may be continued, and inade-
quately describes the circumstances under 
which a hearing may be obtained. No mention 
is made of the ten-day "timely notice 
period." 45 C.F.R. §205.10 (a) (1) (A). r·"Jo 
statement if made concerning the fact that 
under certain circumstances, benefits may 
be continued until the hearing, and that 
unless a determination is made at the hearing 
that the sole issue is one of state or 
Federal law or policy, or change in State 
or Federal law and not one of incorrect 
grant computation, the benefits continue 
pending a determination following the 
hearing. Id. at 713-14. 
The court rejected any contention that the re-
cipients were not entitled to notice of the right to a 
hearing and to continued benefits pending that hearing 
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because the only issue involved was one of state or federal 
law. That determination could only be made at the time of 
the hearing. 
Thus, as Plaintiffs argue, the Courts have 
recognized that even in across-the-board. 
adjustments necessitated by a change in 
law, some mistakes are inevitable, and the 
obvious and irreparable injury which occurs 
when there is an erroneous termination or 
reduction can only be prevented where, as 
contemplated by the regulations herein, 
the State is required " ... to pay aid pending 
in all cases where timely appeals are filed" 
from a proper notice. Yee-Lit v. Richardson. 
353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973) at 999. 
The precautions necessary in this sensitive 
area are not unlike those which form the 
basis of our system of criminal justice 
in this country: our Constitution and laws 
provide safeguards in pursuit of which we 
willingly acquit an occasional guilty man 
in order that we not unwillingly convict 
a single innocent man. Id. at 716. 
Thus, the regulations envision the following fair 
hearing procedure where across-the-board cutbacks are pro-
posed: (1) the provision of ~dequate notice to recipients; 
(2) the recipient requests a hearing; (3) the recipient's 
benefits are continued at the same level until the hearing; 
(4) at the hearing, the hearing officer determines whether 
the sole issue is one of state law or policy; (5) if so, the 
recipient's benefits are reduced and the hearing request is 
dismissed; (6) if a question of fact exists, the hearing 
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proceeds and benefits are continued until the hearing 
officer's decision is rendered. 
This system of postponing any fact/policy deter-
mination until the time of hearing, and of continuing 
benefits at the same level until that hearing, is necessary 
to insure the fairness of that determination. As stated in 
Burlingame v. Schmidt, 368 F. Supp. 429, 434 (E.D. Wis. 
1973): 
A pre-hearing determination of dis-
continuance which is based on the 
application of a fact-policy dis-
tinction is open to abuses, the 
potential for which is not present at 
the hearing or post-hearing stage. 
Much of the .Plaintiffs' concern lies 
with the plight of the unsophisticated 
recipient who, at the pre-hearing stage, 
is burdened with the task of artfully 
pleading a "fact" as opposed to a "policy" 
appeal under a system like the one which 
was found to be objectionable in Yee-Litt, 
wherein a pre-hearing determination is 
made concerning the continuation of aid 
on the basis of a fact-policy distinction. 
However, once the appellant has received 
his hearing and voiced his objections to 
a proposed cut on whatever grounds avail-
able, the situation is changed, and the 
fact-policy distinction becomes viable, 
as in the scheme provided in the HEW 
regulations at 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a). 
By requiring that aid be continued in 
all cases, at least until the hearing is 
held, these HEW regulations have success-
fully abandoned the fact-policy distinc-
tion in that context in which it was 
found to be objectionable by the court 
in Yee-Litt, and yet preserved it at the 
hearing itself, where it is a workable 
standard. 
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Based on S.B. 54 (1979), Respondents eliminated 
what they call the AFDC - Stepchildren (AFDC-SC) program. 
In reality there is only one AFDC program. The purpose of 
this program is to give assistance to children who are 
deprived of parental support. In certain cases when both 
parents are in the home, children still may be eligible for 
AFDC benefits if either parent is unemployed or incapaci-
tated. Therefore, children could be eligible for AFDC 
benefits in certain cases even if a stepparent is in the 
home. 
Respondents' notice of May 10, 1979, R. 102, 
states: "A fair hearing request will not be granted unless 
you feel the reason for the closure action was for other 
than the change in state law.'' The notice contained no 
statement of the conditions under which a hearing could be 
requested. Respondents may deny a request for a hearing 
only if some sort of initial hearing is held at which it is 
determined that the sole issue is one of state or federal 
policy. However, the state may not deny the recipient the 
opportunity for ~ hearing. Respondents should have informed 
recipients of the circumstances under which a hearing could 
be obtained and that recipients were entitled to continued 
assistance until the time of the hearina. 
~ 
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Respondents were still obligated to adequately 
inform recipients of the right to a hearing even though an 
automatic grant adjustment was involved. Under the change 
in the state law, approximately 1850 families involving 3700 
children have lost AFDC benefits. It is likely that many of 
those are wrongfully being denied assistance. Children may 
still be eligible for AFDC benefits if their stepfather is 
dead, incapacitated, unemployed, or has divorced their 
mother or left the home. Since it is likely that even under 
the new law many families will continue to be eligible for 
assistance the recipients were wrongfully denied the oppor-
tunity for a hearing to challenge the withdrawal of their 
benefits and present evidence that they still qualified for 
AFDC assistance. Respondents have denied them a right to a 
hearing by not informing them of this right as required by 
federal law. 
Two recent cases clarify this point. In Stenson 
v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 1331, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Plaintiffs 
sued to prevent termination of Medicaid benefits without 
proper notice and an opportunity for a hearing to show 
continued eligibility on other grounds. The court held: 
New York State is hereby enjoined to restore 
Medicaid benefits to Stenson and members of 
her class until such time as New York State 
determines whether the individual class 
members remain eligible for Medicaid on a 
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ground other than categorical eligibility, 
until such individuals receive timely and 
adequate notice of the proposed termination 
of their Medicaid benefits, and until they 
are accorded the opportunity for a hearing. 
In the present context, this Court should likewise order 
benefits restored until a determination can be made indi-
vidually that each claimant is no longer eligible for AFDC 
assistance. 
In a very recent case decided by the U.S. District 
Court for Utah, Respondent Mitchell and others were ordered 
to adequately notify Medicaid recipients of intended re-
ductions in services and their right to request a hearing in 
connection with such reductions and to reimburse Plaintiffs 
for money expended on services which had be~n reduced or 
terminated, since the initial notice of the change in services 
was inadequate. The Court approved a detailed notice state-
rnent to be sent to all recipients of Medicaid which explained 
in detail the change in the law which produced the service 
cutbacks, the specific services changed and a full explana-
tion of hearing rights and how to request a hearing. Campos 
v. Mitchell, (D. Utah, March 10, 1980) Attached as P'"ppendix 
5. 
Again, the inadequate notice in the present case 
must be re~edied by a new and adequate notice and benefits 
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should be restored to all former recipients until appro-
priate procedures are developed and utilized to implement 
any changes in the AFDC program. 
In conclusion, Respondents' notice is inadeauate 
because it failed to include a statement of the specific 
change in law re~uiring the termination of benefits, and it 
failed to include a statement of the circumstances under 
which a hearing could be obtained and assistance continued. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' "NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION" 
DELETING THE AFDC-STEPCHILDREN'S 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM VIOLATED THE UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING ACT. 
Administrative agencies in Utah must adopt rules 
according to the provisions of the Administrative Rule-
making Act as contained in UCA §63-46-1, et seq. 
provides in part: 
Prior to the adoption, amendment, or 
repeal of any rule, the agency shall: 
(a) Give notice of its intended action. 
§63-46-5 
This notice shall include a statement of 
either the terms or substance of the in-
tended action or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved, the reasons 
for the proposed rule, and the time when, 
the place where, and the manner in which 
interested persons may present their 
views regarding it. The notice ... shall 
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be published in the bulletin to be pub-
lished by the state archivist ... Except 
as provided in subsections (2), (3), and 
(4) of this section, no action shall be 
taken by the agency until at least twenty 
days have elapsed following such mailing 
and publication of this notice. 
On April 13, 1979, Respondents filed a "Notice of 
Agency Action" with the State Archivist indicating an 
"Emergency Adoption" of a rule deleting the Stepchild 
Assistance Program. R. 103. ~his notice was published in 
the Utah Bulletin on May 1, 1979 and the deletion of the 
Stepchild Assistance Program was to take effect on May 8, 
1979, only seven days later. 
An emergency adoption of an agency rule must 
comply with the provisions of UCA §63-46-5(2). This section 
provides: 
If an agency finds that an imminent peril 
to the public health, safety, or welfare 
requires adoption of a rule without pro-
viding the notice required by subsection 
(1) of this section and states in writinq 
its reasons for that finding, it may pro: 
ceed without prior notice of hearing, or 
upon any abbreviated notice and hearing 
that it finds practicable, to adopt an 
emergency rule. The rule mav be effective 
for a period of not longer than 120 days, 
but the adoption of an identical rule 
under subsection (1) of this section is 
not precluded. (emphasis added). 
There was no imminent peril to the public health, 
safety, or welfare which required an emergency deletion of 
the Stepchild Assistance Program. This program provides 
AFDC benefits to needy children with a stepfather in the 
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-·· 1' 
home. The program could not possibly pose an imminent peril 
to the public well-being. Particularly since the welfare of 
many children was involved, the Respondents had a duty to 
rigorously follow the ·rule-making procedure. Here no 
reasons of any intelligible sort were given to justify this 
emergency action. 
Respondents thus violated §63-46-5(2) by not 
stating in writing their reason~ as required by statute. By 
wrongfully deleting the stepchild assistance under an 
emergency adoption procedure, Respondents denied Appellants 
the right to a twenty day lapse of time before the deletion 
went into effect as provided in §63-46-5(1) and the oppor-
tunity to participate in rule making as provided in UCA 
§63-46-5 (1) (b). 
§63-46-5 (5) provides that ,. [n] o rule hereafter 
adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance 
with this section." Courts have held that rules not promul-
gated in compliance with State administrative procedure acts 
are void. See, e.g. Adams v. Professional Practices Commission, 
524 P.2d 932, 933 (Okla. 1974). 
In a case similar to the present case, Burke v. 
Children's $~rvice Division, 26 Or. App. 145, 552 P.2d 592 
(Ct. App. 1976), the court held that the Oregon Children's 
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Services Division (CSD) had violated the rule-making pro-
visions of the Oregon Administrative Procedures Pct by 
issuing a rule terminating the program of direct child care 
payments without giving Plaintiff and others similarly 
situated proper notice and an opportunity to be heard by CSD 
, -,. 
before the program was terminated. The Court held that the 
rule was ineffective and the program could not be deleted 
until proper rulemaking procedures were followed. Federal 
Courts in cofi~truing similar notice requirements in the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553, have 
reached the same conclusion. One of the earliest of these 
cases is Hatch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 
1954). The Court stated unequivocally that the procedural 
provisions established for administrative agencies are an 
inherent part of legislative delegation of authority. In 
the words of that court, "Unless the prescribed procedures 
",; 
are complied with, the agency (or administrative) rule has 
not been legally issued, and consequently it is ineffective." 
Id. at 283. 
In'a more recent case, Kelly v. United States, 339 
. 
F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 1972), involving the sale of Indian 
lands by the Interior Department, the court addressed the ,..,. 
issue of whether regulations issued in violation of the 
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APA's notice requirement are valid. ~he Interior Department 
there invoked the "good cause" exception allowing notice to 
be dispensed with if compliance is impracticabl~, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest. The reasons for 
non-compliance must be indicated for the notice requirement 
to be validly avoided. This is also required by UCA §63-46-
5 (2). Because this requirement was not com~lied with, the 
court reaffirmed the holding of Hatch that, "administrative 
regulations are void unless published in strict conformity 
with the Administrative Procedure P.ct." Id. at 1101. The 
Court accordingly found the regulations authorizing the land 
sale to have been illegally authorized and granted Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue. See also City of 
New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 
and cases cited therein. 
The cases cited above are clear in indicating that 
strict compliance with procedural rules is necessary for the 
valid enactment of rules by administrative agencies. Any 
rule promulgated without such compliance is strictly an 
ultra vires act having no legal significance. Respondents 
here have adopted a rule in violation of the Utah Adminis-
trative Rul~;making Act. The rule deleting the Stepchild 
Assistance Program must be held void until proper procedures 
are followed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aooellants have demonstrated that Respondents have J: J.. 
improperly and unlawfully deprived some 1,850 families in 
Utah of welfare benefits to which they are entitled under 
federal law and regulations. Respondents are bound to 
follow these regulations and have not done so. Procedurally, 
Respondents have terminated these benefits without adequate 
notice to the affected families, both in the terms of the 
May 10, 1979 notice which virtually precluded requests for 
hearings and decided a priori that no hearings were necessary, 
and in Res~ondents' non-compliance with the Utah Administra-
tive Rule-making Act. Appellants' children are dependent, 
needy, are eligible and are being denied AFDC benefits 
improperly. 
The constitutionality of S.B. 54 is not at issue 
in this lawsuit but RespondEnts'purported application of it 
is. The Legislature can pass a bill such as S.B. 54 but the 
bill does not require and federal law does not allow Respondent 
to reshape long established federal definitions of eligibility 
for AFDC benefits. This Court should adopt the well-reasoned 
views of HEl\7 and hold that Appellants are eligible for AFDC 
benefits un~r federal law, since there is no state law of 
general applicability which requires stepparents to support 
stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adootive 
.c 
parents must support their children. 
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Appellants request this Court declare Respondents' 
actions violative of State and Federal statutes and regu-· 
lations and enjoin Respondents from continuing ·these illegal 
actions. Appellants and the class they represent should be 
awarded AFDC benefits from the time they were improperly 
terminated. The decision below should be reversed. 
tL 
Respectfully submitted this 
_ _.__'M_~---' 1980. 
J-{ -day of 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Paul M. Tinker and 
Sharon Peacock, Assistant Attorneys General, State Capitol 
-~ _ jj_ d f Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this ;); .. ay o 
.March, 1980 ...... 
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,,. .. , 
JUN 8 i979 
Dr. i\.nt~ony :·;. :-!itc:H:ll 
~~ccutivc Director 
D2~;~~rt.s~r.t. of Scci2l ~,ervic·~s 
151 \·;est : .. ort·:1 T~-::~:-::lc 
Salt L::.ke City, Utan 8-1103 
Dear Dr. Mitchell: 
FA-1-6 
T!-.i~ is t.o fc!'..·~211 y ~H::vi.s2 Y·::IU t:::l.t t"::~ rrop·:':S 17'::.~ 2.T'.":-.:~r-:(b':!nt 
to the Utz~ h t i t 1 c I ~1.- ,\ :: t;::, t £! D l an, f! n t it 1 c d " D 2:; riv a t ion o f 
St::-·r-ort in p_,2l<1tior. to thf! St~-:-::·r2re:1t 11 , tr<J.n::>~i ttcd !:ly 
PC0-11 #73-10, is not approva~le. 
As you arc 2.-...·arc, bec2usc of the nature of t11e plcn arr.end-
n:cn t, \-,'c ref<:~r:rG'd this Ma teric:! l to our .Rcc;io!"l; l ... ~ ttorr.ey 
for revic::.4 ~r.·-3 cc;:;~cnt::i. i...::::-,o!; ot1r rer:ucst, t1:is rr.:ittcr ·~as 
givc!1 a "priority'' st~tus to c:n<J~lc u:; to r:--.c~:e a ti::.c:ly 
re3fO?~s~ to you. ;\s t'!lc R~r;ion2l .~.ttorr:'::y 1 s of ficc h:i.: 
.cl.t:"ec.dy cor:sid.:.~r~c tf'.i!:.-: i:=:;.::::~.:e s:::v;:~re.l ti::-.0s in t~c pc.st t\..ro 
ye.2r:~, t~1cir <1tte:ntior: t::i.s ti;..;; ·,,·:i;:; c'!5rect':.:d tc·.;2rd dcb:~r­
P1inir:q ', .. :!i~t~~or t~-:c Dc;~.artr::cr.t 1 ~ ::oJ. icy, t:-1::~ o[ follo•.liwJ 
t~:·; '1 triT.".21rtit0 tr:st 11 set fort·:; 't)'~· t;,c 1.J. S. S\.::;:.c-·?.:o;c Cot:rt 
ir: Lr:'"~ . _~~ vs. r·'.:!!:"t.:ti;/ :::.7 u. s. 5)7. (107')) I h~J ~)2(::D !1:0~.:Ji~i'2d. 
~ y t ~>-:: C() r. t c n t o f the ck c i s i on c i: t ~-: 2 U • s. • Co '...n- t o f ~\ :-'· ;., c:: ~ l s 
in Arcr.~h.1.ld vs. ~:h;:i.J.71::0, 555 F.2d l:').Sl (1st Cir. l'.}7'7). 
We have now been c.dvis.::d t~iat althou~;!1 tl'-;e '!>:r3..:.t'.:.ent is 
c::msidr:rin0 ~";1;~tr~er t1--.cir i:-olicy ;-:.2rt2i Tli::r:r to th~; tr-e .. ~t~ent 
of steo:x-:ir;nts under ti tlc. IV-J.. of U:~ ~~c.cL:.l Sr..!curi ty .i\ct 
Sh'"'l.11'"1 ,~0 F'Q,.:i.:.:.i.-..:i l·,..... li'rr-..,t O'- t->)n :\rc.._~.;l-.:-:>l:-1 r~t-·ci:-ior., unlPSS 
.6 _./ '-A •J.,,.. '"~ ...._ • .J...J ... ..1,.\...,;;.L!, •" ':~L' _ .. -·' .... _:__·---'-·--'_ . .::__:.._·--·- _,.. .. _ ~- 'I -
a -:":·.?els ion to c112 :ir;8 the nresr.n t -:;0 Ji C':' i ~; : ·.::<'. e, "'-~ i c:: ~2 s 
not yet occurrAJ, t1:~ Dc?.Jrtr:;(?~t is still follo'.·:iriq ti1e 
''tri~2rtit8 tcst. 11 
As you will rcc~ll fron our corrcs?ona~~cc to you eatc~ 
Sept 8 '."7",::: c r 2 ~ , l <)7 7 , u r: ,_: P- r t h i. s · 11 t r i 1:.;;. rt i t c t cs t 11 , t '.i e s u fl port 
obli~ation of the stcp~arent 2ust b~: 
APPENDIX 1 
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1. a duty of general ·applicability; 
2. one in which he could be com~cllec1 by court order 
to fulfill even after he has deserted or a~andoned 
the household; and 
3. one which·~ust exist regardless of whether the 
chilr~rcn would otherwis(~ rccei ve A'FDC :-:·a r,.!:"!nts. 
~:e b::!s~ our decision not to a")prove t~is title IV-1-. ;.>lan 
a1-aend~:1ant on objections to t~~- £ollowir.g parts of the 11 Utah 
Sup?ort of Stepchildren'' law: 
Section 2. Section 72-45-4.li 
Tho second !13.rt.of the "trip<lrtite testtt refer-red to is 
interpreted c.s :;ermittir.q a St3tc to consieler 2. stc!.Jro.rent 
a 11 pZJrent 11 fnr l-.FI:'C r:urr--oses only wi1cr: he is cercrnor.ially 
~arried to the child's natural or ad0ntive p~r0nt, and Gtatc 
l;;·,.· icposes a su.:)port o::,ligeltion on th~ ster:,2r·-~nt that is 
coextensive with that i~~os9d on a naturnl or a2ootive narent. 
Federal r-.. ')licy has been th<1t in order for a ste;i:rarent to be 
co~sicered to be leqally obli~ated to sup?ort his stepchild-
ren "to the sa~e extent that ~atural or adoptive parents are 
re(}uired to support. th~ir c=-:ih~r.zn, 11 it is necessary th2.t 
the ste~parent•s liability e~tc~d for the ~uration of the 
rnarria0c which creates the stery-relatio~shi~. so thnt if 
the ster-·~3.rent abandon·s the fz-:~ilv er is ot~~crwise absent, he 
.... /:'~ ... i' "".- - 1" 1' ..... ~l ~ ;:""r ~ 1 1n~r-i~t· o.c t'h,.,. ~ ~ t ~ ....... c,11· ] ·lrr·n a- . rel"]~ a 
....... ,~.a ~,!."") o;,..; ~ .-11;.J ""·-.. ~·" .:- .. ·~...... J... 1 .. ::._ :. ... , ~-~ _, ~ -'·~ '.;_ 1 ::> l"'i 4, ,., _ _. 
r.::;tural pc.rent. Th?. vt2:1 lm·: st?.te:=;, ~s to tr!~ step~arent:~, 
however, that ''in cases where there is a fll?d pending aivorce 
action ·,!i th senaration or ir~ cases where there is a leer Al 
s·:;r.aration 'bet~·!een the .ste!:)'.:""--2\r0nt and the chiJ -3 •s nn.tu~al 
parent, the sup~ort obligation shall be as if the ~artiaqe had 
never ta~en olace." 3ection 30-4-3 of the Utah Cece i\.nnotated 
provides, with rcs:r-ect to th8 power. of a Court to order a 
natural or adontive parent to sup~ort his childran when the 
parents arc legally sep3rated, that ~ ••• the court ~ay 
decree (to the wife) money for her su~~ort a~d th2 support of 
minor children •••• " Further, section 3•1-3-S of the Utah 
Code Annotc.ted wrovides that ~.!t-!H?n .a <]~_cr·~c of C!ivorce is 
entered, the Co~rt ~3Y ;ake sudh ~raers in rel~tion to the 
muir.te!'1ancc of the oarties and th-8 diilclren as :-ra·:" be er:uitable; 
ana s<!ction 78-45a-i provi:1es that the father of a child which 
is or·may be born out of wedlock is liable to the sarre extent 
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Thr;s0 euthar:ities HOUld c.~ea:r to ir:c1icate that the obliqation 
of a st(:::)r::rcnt to .'3Ur.::~o:.--t :-!is ~-~t.E::~chiJ.·] is not, und~r the 
inst:int ar:~Cr.'J-~-:-,-3nts, c::czt~nzi·i..T2 \:ith tz10 oblic2tio'.;1 of a 
natural or 2c:ic;,tive ~.::lrent to sun:}ort hi:3 child and th::it the 
proposea State plan ~~en~ment, t~~refore, is not approvable 
under the existing criteria. 
Section 3. Section 78-45-4.2: 
Under present D"~rartr:tcnt policy, we find this s~ction, -Khich 
gives the stepp2rent th0 r.ight to recover from the n.;:itural 
or adoptive parent, t~e ~2ounts expenc0d by hi~/hcr for the 
support of his/h3r stepc~ild~2n, unacccptcble. A provision 
such as this is not c~n3istent with the rc0uir~~ents of 
45 CFR 233.90(a) which de~anas that with r~spect to child 
support liability, stepparents be treated in the same manner 
as natural or adoptive parcnts,·with'no exceptions. 
Ne are advising you that this policy also is un~er review by 
the Department, but again, unless a a~cision to change the 
present policy is rr:adc, which has not yet oacurred, the cur-
rent policy zt2nds, cwusinq this section also to be reason for 
reco~mending disapproval. 
We will be rccorr..rnending the disupproval of this title IV-A 
plan amcn_d:::ent to thr'1 Associate Cor1i1llSsio!"ler for Family 
.fi.ssistance.. Upon his concurrence 'f.vi th the disap!Jroval action, 
w~ will be sending you official notification of the disapproval 
Once such a disar.?roval is official, should the State continue 
to operate based upon the disapproved material, the withhqld-
ir.g of all title IV-A FFP could result. 
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Dr. Anthony W. ~itchell 4 
We regret the inconven;i.enc'3 which ".·lill result frori:i our 
decision that yocr pro~osed nlan a~ena~ent is not ao~rovable. 
Although we were unable to d~velop a d~finitive sta~~e prior 
to the impl€mt?.ntation date of your Su-pport of Stc::1childrcn 
Act, Wt:! h3ve been able to ir..fo!T.l you of the non-arprovabj_li ty 
of this 2~en~nent within the 90-~ay ti~e p~riod s~ecif icd in 
· 45 CPR 201.3(e). It is unfortunate that the lcgisl~tive 
process could not have been influ~ncsd in such a way as to 
be mo.re responsive to the polnts of concern He had cor.sistcntl~ 
raised since 1977 about similar lcqir~lction. }i.c1ditionally, it 
is ul"'~.;ays 'h~lpful on inportant iszu-~s suet as t'his to ?7.31~e 
every effort to delay imnlementation (aqain throu0h apprising 
the legislature of the im~act on Federal fundinq) until 
regional office appraisal bf a proposed plan arnena~ent is 
concluacd. 
The Office of Fanily ..?:..ssistance staff stands ready to assist 
you in whatever man~er you deen o.npropriate in this matter. 
Please contact Ms. Leza Gooden at (303) 837-564~ for whatever 
additional information or assistance you r.2.y feel necessary. 
Your cooperation in this matter has been appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Patricia J. Livers 
J\cting P.egion.al C01:-:missioner 
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Dr. l-.!1 t~D~Y \r!. ~11i tche 11 
r::-:ecutivc Director 
~:;>2 ~t;:;c:1t of Social Services 
150 :-.~cs t !'Jorth 'l:;r.:nle 
Sa·l t Lu~~c City, Utoh 8410 3 
Dear Dr. Mitchell: 
I -
This corres?ondcnce officially notifies you th:lt the title 
IV-;\ plan a~ench7lent subnii tted uncer PC0-11 H79-10, entitled 
"r.e;n·ivation of Su;::i;;-ort ;in Ecl2tion to the Stepric:.n~nt, 11 is 
cis?.IJ.:Jroved. T~-:is actio11 is bei::0 t-?.::-en after consultation 
with the :\ssociate Co:::.:::issio~c~r ;or ?c.:'"'.:ilv Assi.star.ce. That 
corisul tation re::>1.1l tcd in the cclet:i.on of ~l!r previously noted 
o~jt3cticns to Section 3. Sc2tior. 78-45-4.2 of the "Utah 
Sup:?ort of St,epchildren" 12·\/. 
As in:1ic~ted in our corre0ror..d.er.ce to you dat£d June 8, 1979, 
in order for a stepparent SUDport law to racet the require-
ments of ~5 CFa S 233.90(a), it must b2 a S~ate law of qeneral 
applicability w11i ch re".:}uir~s s tcpp;.:ffer.ts· to sup'0Qrt stepchild-
ren to the sarac extent that their !12tl:ra1 or adcpti ve r;arents 
are r8q_uircd to support their childr~0. A n~view of your 
"Support of Ste9children" la·.-r (S.:-3. t~o. 54) indicates that it 
does not n-2et t:1ese requirernDnts, atl.d therefor.;, the related 
ti t:'.e IV-A amend.!\.ent rr.us t be disu.pproved. 
The decision to disapprove this title IV-A plan amend~ent is 
based on objections to the following section of the "Utah 
Support of Stepchildren" law: 
Section 2. Section 78-45-4:1: 
"· 
45 CF~ S 233.90(a) permits a State to consider a stepparent 
a "parentu for AFDC purposes only w:··wn he is ceremonially 
married to the child's natural or adontive pa.rent, and State 
l::iw inposcs a support obligation on the stc~parent that is 
coextensive with that imposed on a natural or adoptive parent. 
APPENDIX 2 
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2 
?2de.:-.:1l ::·oli·:~:'" l:.::~3 ~·:en t~2t in or:-":r:r for a stc:-:7".::.t:-cnt to 
b-~ C':;:;.:::.J..:kTC»:: t.O be 10(;.:: ll \i ·:)~)lic;.:;.t2d to su::>:;0rt his 
ste?c:;ild::-cn 11 t8 t':le s2.-:·.2 ·:::!::tcr»t t'.-;Z\t r:2tur0l or 2do2tivt: 
p:?.rents 2:-~ :-cq" .. \ir~:-1 to st:::i:---·o!:"t t:;±ir c:1ilr:::r.:~!1, it is 
n0c82sz.rv t.h.J.t tr:t3 sto0~::-.:.rc'nt 1 s 1i~·">i11· +-v C)·.-~(•nA for 
- -~ - -~- . ._J -··''-- ·- - -· 
the C.:~ratior1 of th·::. r.~1:::-i2Jt-! ·<'!~;ich cz:-~.'}t~s. ti".? ste~-
relationshir~ 20 that i£ t~~ ster~2r~~t ~han~o~s the 
fa::lily or is otho~vise c:i'::-)sent:, h~ rc111air .. s li2':::-le for 
suppo::-t of t1-:(: s t·~;,chilc rcn, 2.S ·.D~J h~ a n2t~.!ra 1 02re.nt. 
Th '.'."> T '!' ·'- ...., h i - • • - t ~ L.. ~ ,.. """ ,.. t t • t '- ' .. ... ,c.; \ . .) l.<- ' ~~·,..,. ~=> t...i. \...~.....,), "-"'·"-' o .. n~ ~ -~r.;~::ir~!1 ~s, n·::>~lt~-:...r2r, 
that "in c~.1se:s Hh:.?re ttcre is a fiL~.d ''J2n:Jir:11 a.i":t~rc.~ 
action ~.vith s::'!;-.,2rat.ion· or in cas0r3 \·;};ere tlv:?re is a lec;Zll 
scparatio!1 bc~b.reen the s tepparc~t and th8 c~ilc1.' s natural 
parent, th8 sup?or~ obliqation shall be as if the ~arriage 
; had n~~vcr ta~t:en pL.1c<~. 11 S~ctio:1 30-·~-3 of t'::e Utah Code 
Annotated proviocs, wi t'h resp~ct to the po·.v-er of a 
Court to ord~r a nc.tural or adontive ~arcr.t to sur.icort 
his chilcren \.t~en th'2, :rarcnts c~e lcc;zl1y scparat·~d. that 
" • th~ court r1:.~y r1-3cr~e (to t'h-? ~1i f·~) r.:on~y for her 
support and thn supp0rt o= r:!ir.or children. • • t• Furt'her, 
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah C~1e Annotat~d ~rovides t~at 
~rhen - •1ncre('> o+= r1-i "'O~c-::. i~· r.nJc<".';~·::"lo,:J t'-"" C-o,,-.i. ..... ':"I~, r",.·,:::l.,, ... :n :r, •• • d U--· _ ~- '·'- _ _..." '- t.,. .:, --s.. '-""J..1: .. , • .:. 1 &t-:., "-\A.~" ... '~'U,t '- ... i....:. 
such orcers in relation to t1:t~ r~2int'2~ance of the 
parties and the chilar~n as ~ay b~ e~uita~le; and · 
section 73-45a-1 rrovic·~5 that· the f,:.th-er of a child which 
is or may be born out of 'wedlock is li~ble to the same 
extent as t~.:! fat:-ier of a c!lild born in ~ .. 1edloc"'.<.. J._'l'\d, 
in R·~Dv~s vs. R~cvQ.:?_, 556 fl· 2d 1267 (Utu.h l'J7G), the 
Uta~1 Supreme Court, ci ti r.ry SS 7 2-45- 3 c:nn ·1 of t1;-:; Utc.h 
Code l'\nnotatcd, held that "the c~1ildren nrc uncon.:ii tionally 
entitled to suyport fro~ their par~nts; and the State is 
authorized by law and shoul1 be oncouraqed and aided as 
a nutt~r of r;ublic policy to s0e t!lat t:"1at responsibility 
is borne by then both initially and in any necessary 
subsequen.t proceedings. 11 
Th9.se authoritj.cs would ?.ppear to indicate that the obliqu.-
tion of a stepparent to SU?~ort his stepchild is not, unaer 
the instant ar.;end::-.ents, coextensive with the obligation of 
a natural or adoptive parent to support his child and that 
the ~roposed State plan amend~ent, therefore, is not 
approvuble under the existing criteria. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
U9on rcceirt of this cor~eS?O~d~nce, you have been offi-
ci2lly notified of th~ dis~~?~ov~l of the title IV-A 9lan 
a~·2!1'~:-:?cr:t sub::-.i tt0 1~ un-=:0r 'FCJ-11 ;~79-10. ~;e 'hcJ.V2 t'r.erefore 
enclos(;(] your co~;i~:J of ?OJ-11 #79-10, which have been 
w.r..n0t:i.t-;d to ir..r.~ic-ut0 c1L,:::ip')rov.:!l. Shoulcl t:~-~ .St~,te 
c;.:>nt.ir:ue to (l-;JSr:.t~ :i:ts ·titlr;; T.\'-A :;::rot":r~:-:i i~ 2ccord2nce 
with tr:is r3i02~Tro,i2d. n2t':'!rial, a forF~ul cor.0U.anc,~ issu~ 
will be r2ised, which could result ·1n the ~1~hholdinq of 
all title IV-A funds. 
You have t:·w riq~1t to 11ave this decision to disaDprovc 
reconsi6r::r··:=d by th.e D~ruty Co:-;:rds:;i.oner of SccLnl Security, 
under Section 1116 of tho Social Security Act, within 
60 cays after this notification. 
Sinccrely1 
Patricia J. Livers 
.Z\cting Regional Cor:1l:dssioner 
Enclosures 
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Enrolled Copy 
s. a. No. 6 
SUP PO in' OF STEPCli I LOREN 
1900 
BUDGET SESSION 
By K. S. Cornaby 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE DUTY OF STEPPARENTS TO SUPPORT 
STEPCHILDREN; DELETING LANGUAGE ALLOWING A CESSATION Of A 
STEPPARENT'S DUTY TO SUPPORT STEPCHILDREN DURING A PENDING 
DIVORCE ACTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION; AND DEFINING THE TERM 
"STEPPARENT." 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 78-45-4. l, UTAH CODE ANNOTP.TED 1953, AS 
ENACTED BY CHAPTER 131, LArJS OF UTt\!-l 1979, AND SECTION 78-
45b-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMEIIDED BY 
CHAPTER 131, LAWS OF UTAH 1979. 
Scct1on 1. Section 78-45-4.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to 
read: 
78-15-1. 1. A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the 
tH1rnc ox tent Lhnt n natural oi· udoptive parent ie rcqu1 rod to 
cupport a child. P1·ovicled, however, thnt upon the tennination 
of the marriage or common law relationship between the 
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive pnrent[**,*or*in 
cases*whcre*there**is**a**filed**pending**divorce**action**with 
separation*or*a*legal*separation*between*the*stepparent*and*the 
child's*natural*parcnt,**) the support obligation shall {**be 
as*if*the•marriage"had*never•taken*place**l ~er~ate. 
Section 2. Section 70-45b-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to 
read: 
7 8 - '1 Sb - 2 . A s u s e d i n th i s ch a p t e r· : 
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S. B. No. 6 
( l) "Department" means the state department of 
social services. 
( 2) "Dependent child" means any person under the 
age ofl8 who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, 
married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States. 
11 (J) "Court order" means any judgment or order o! any 
district court of this state or of any court of comparable 
jurisdiction of .~nether ·~tate ordering payment of a set or 
determinable amount of support money. 
(4) "Support debt" means the debt created by nonpayment 
of child support under the laws of this state or the decree 
of any court of appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to 
be paid as child support. 
( 5) "Need" means the ·, necessary costs of food, 
clothing, shelter and medical attendance for the support 
of any dependent child. 
( 6) "Disposable earnings 11 means that part of the earnings 
of any individual remaining after the deduction from 
those earnings of any amount required by law to be withheld. 
( 7) "Assistance" means any assistance for aid to 
families with dependent children. 
( 8) "Person" includes any natural person, firm, 
corporation, association, political subdivision or department. 
(9) "Responsible parent" means the natural parent, 
adoptive parent, or stepparent of a dependent child. 
(10) "Earnings" mean compens~tion paid or payable for 
personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, 
commission, bonus, or otherwise, and specifically include 
periodic payment pursuant to pension or retirement programs, 
or insurance policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically 
include all gain derived from capi~al, from labor. or from both 
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of 
capital assets. 
-2-
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S. B. No. 6 
(11) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to 
a child's natural or adoptive parent who is not the child's 
natural or adoptive parent or one living with the natural or 
adoptive parent as a common law soouse, whose common law 
marriage was entered into in a state which recognizes the 
validity of common law marriage. 
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IN THE UNITED. ST:\TES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 
MARGAfl.ETTE CURTIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. TCA 78-732. 
ORDER 
RECEIVED 
'JUL l 0 1978 
WILLIAM J. PACE, JR., 
individually and as Secretary 
of the State of Florida De-
partment of Health and Re-
habilitative Services, 
Defendants. 
NATJOUAl ClE,\RJ)IGHOUSE 
FOR lEGAl .mv1m 
This case is before the court for consideration of 
numerous motions. Heuring on plaintiffs' motions for pre-
liminary injunctive relief and for partial swrunary judg-
ment was held on April 5, 1978. At th~ hearing the court 
:11ade the following rulings on other pending motions: (1) 
defendant's motion to dismiss and .motion to dismiss the 
first amended complaint shall be denied, since abstention 
is inappropriate under the circumstances of this case and 
exhaustion of state remedies is not generally a bar to an 
action for relief brought under 42 U.S.C. 51983, Gibson 
J, v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 11973); (2) defendant's motions 
\.... 
to take judicial notice of state court proceedings and 
state adjudicatory administrative proceedings shall be 
granted; and (J) plaintiffs' motion to strike shall b~ 
___ __,.,.. 
denied. 
Additionally, the court has. carefully considered 
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, and is of the 
opinion that this case should proceed as a class action 
pursuant to Rule 23 (a) & (b) (2), Federal Rules of Civil 
1373 APn I J P~ 3: 50 
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procedure. 
Plaintiffs' motion to continue preliminary in-
junction and for partial summary judgment are based upon 
the same legal contention -- that the notice issued by 
defendant dated October 20, 1977, is "inadequate» with-
in the meaning of 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a} (4). That regula-
tion provides: 
(4) In cases of intended action to 
discontinue, te~minate, suspend or reduce~ 
assistance: 
(i) The State or local agency shall 
give timely and adeq~ate notice ..• 
Where;the intended action is the result of a change in state 
law requiring automatic grant adjustment, as it is in 
the present case, the required notice is considered "ade-
quate" if 
it includes a statement of the intended 
action, the reasons for such intended 
action, a statement of the specific 
change in law requiring such action and 
a statement of the circumstances under 
which a hearing may be obtained and as-
sistance continued. 
45 C.F.R. 5205.lO(a) (4) {iii). 
Th~ October 21, 1977, notice mailed by defendant to 
' 
the class of Medicaid recipients represented by plaintiffs 
falls short of the "adequate notice" requirement in two 
respects. First, the notice provides no statement of the 
specific change in law which required the changes in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Second, the notice gives an insufficient "statement 
of the circumstances under which a hearing may be obtained 
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and assistance continued." The right to a hearing and 
continuation of benefits is specified in 45 C.F.R. 
§205 .10 (a) (6): 
( 6) if the recipient requests a hearing 
within the timely notice period: 
(i) Assistance shall not be sus-
pended, reduced, discontinued or 
terminated ... until a decision 
is rendered after a hearing, unless: 
(A) a determination is made at 
t.he hearing that the sole issue isone 
of State or Federal law or policy, or 
change in State or ~ederal law and 
not one of incorrect grant compu-
tation. (emphasis added). 
These regulations entitle recipients of benefits to a 
hearinq and the continuation,of benefits pending the hear-
ing. Benefits may be terminated only when it is determined 
"at the hearing" that the only issue is one involving a 
change in state or federal law. The October 2l, 1977, 
notice wholly fails to apprise affected recipients of 
the·ir rights under §205 .10 (a) (6), and therefore cannot be 
considered ·"adequate" within the contemi?lation of §205.10 
(a) (4) (iii). Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977); Turner v. ~, 435 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. Mo. 1977). 
Accordingly, since defendant's notice does not con-
lo rm to the requirements o: lz.v. and there are :10 disput~d 
issues of material fact, plaintiffs are entitled to summary 
judgment on Count I enjoining defendant from enforcing 
the changes in Medicaid benefits indicated'in the notice 
dated October 21, 1977, until defendant provides adequate 
notice as required b:( 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) (i) & (iii). 
{' The motion for continuance of preliminary injunction is 
rendered moot by the disposition of plaintiffs' swnmary 
judgment motion, and it shall conse9uently be denied. 
The final motion that is presently pending is plain-
tiffs' motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to 
-3-
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plaintiffs' amended supplemental complaint. This motion 
i 
raises the issue whether defendant's notice of March 1, 
1978, regarding implementation of a $.50 co-payment for 
prescription drugs is "~dequate." 
There are four general prerequisites for a pre-
liminary injunction: 
(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff 
will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial 
threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable 
injury if the injunction is not granted, 
(3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff 
outweighs the threatened harm the injunction 
~ay do to defendant, and (4) that granting 
the preliminary injunction will not disserve 
the public interest. 
Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 
F. 2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). In the case at bar~ the 
court finds that all four of the above requirements are 
satisfied. 
Plaintiffs have plainly demonstrated a likeli-
hood of success on the merits of this action, because 
the notice mailed March 1, 1978 is "inadequate." The 
notice states, "If you beli~ve that this agency action 
constitutes an individual incorrect grant computation, 
you may appeal this action and request a hearing." As 
written, the notice improperly attempts to.restrict the class 
of persons who may request a hearing to those who claim 
an incorrect grant computati~n. As discussed above, 45 C.F.R. 
5205.10 contemplates that any benefit recipient can re-
quest a hearing. It is only at the hearing that the state 
agency is authorized to inquire whether the issue involves 
-4-
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~~ate or federal law or policy and not an incorrect g~ant 
computation. 45 C.F.R. S205.lO(a) (6). Defendant's notice 
does not apprise the entire class of Medicaid recipients 
of their entitlement to a hearing, and consequently does 
not pass muster under the federal regulations. 1 
For two reasons, there is also a substantial threat 
that plaintiffs and the class they represent will suffer 
irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not 
granted. First, this court cannot under the E1eventh 
Amendment order retroactive payment by the State of Florida 
of unlawfully withheld Medicaid benefits. See Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Mathias v. City of Mil-
waukee Dep't. of City Development, 377 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. 
Wis • .:. 1974). 
Second, plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrate the 
drastic effects that implementation of the co-payment pro-
posal will have on their finances and health. "The in-
jury to those whose health is maintained on the slender-
est chemical balance provided through medication is not 
merely irreparable, it is ultimate." Becker v. Toia, 
supra, at 336, quoting Bass v, Richardson, 388 F. Supp. 
478, 489 (S. D. N.Y. 1971). This injury is especially 
significant in the case of those class members who are 
confined in nursing homes, for they are limited to a 
monthly income of $25.00 for all personal needs excepting 
nursing home care. The co-payment would significantly 
reduce these persons' already meager resou~ces. 
The remaining two requirements of the Canal Authority 
test demand little discusion. The threatened injury to 
plaintiffs outweighs any detriment to the State of Florida 
that may be occasioned by the grant of a preliminary in-
junction. The fiscal burdens faced, by Florida as a result 
of inadequate budgeting do not loom large in comparison 
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to the direct, deleterious consequences to plaintiffs 
1 if an injunction is not ordered. Florida is posse~sed 
of alternative means of obtaining needed funds to avoid 
a budget defic~t. Moreover, even as~uming that the 
injury to defe~dant resulting from grant of an injunction 
will be substantial, the balance of the equities favo~s 
1 the party who is most likely to prevail on the merits --
in this case, the plaintiffs. 
The public interest will be served by granting the 
requested preliminary injunction because injunctive relief 
will vindicate and protect the procedural rights belonging 
to plaintiffs under federal law. 
~In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss filed October 31, 
1977, is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended 
complaint is DENIED. 
J. Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class is GRANTED. 
'\ 
[, The ~lass shall consist of all Medicaid recipients in the 
State of Florida. Within this class shall be three dis-
tinct subclasses: 
(a) ~11 Medicaid recipients in the State of 
I 
Florida residing in nursing homes. ' , 
l 
(b) All Medicaid recipients in the State o~ 
Florida who are under the age of 21 and are eligible for 
Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) 
services. 
(c) All Medicaid recipients in the State of 
Florida who require more than three physician visits per 
month. 
4. Defendant's motion to take judicial notice of 
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state court proceedings is GRANTED. 
5. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 
as to Count I is GRANTED. Defendant is hereby permanently 
enjoined from enforcing the reductions in Medicaid bene-
fits effective November 1, 1977, until defendant provides 
adequate notice of the reductions in compliance with 
45 C.F.R. S205.10(a) {4) (iii) to plaintiffs and the members 
of the class they represent. The clerk of the court shall 
enter a final judgment as tQ Count I declaring that the 
notice of reduction of Medicaid benefits issued by de-
fendant on October 21, 1977, is inadequate as a matter 
of l<\w, 45 C.F.R. §205.10 (a) (4) (iii), and that the re-
duction in benefits effective November 1, 1977, is also 
invalid as a consequence of the provision of inadequate 
notice. 
6. Plaintiffs' motion to continue preliminary in-
junction is DENIED as moot. 
7. Defendant's motion to take judicial notice of 
sta~~ adjudicatory administrative proceeding is GRANTED. 
8. Plaintiffs' motion to strike is DENIED. 
9. Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 
pu .• :sua11t to plaint::f fs' ar.1en<led St.lpplemental com?lu.int is 
GRl\.NTED. Pending final disposition of this action, de-
fendant is hereby enjoined from requiring plaintiffs and 
the class they represent to pay a $.SO co-payment for. 
·each prescription covered by Medicaid unless and until 
adequate notice in compliance with 45 C.F.R. §205.10 is 
provided to plaintiffs and the class. 
DONE J\ND ORDERED this /...3~ay of April, 197 8. 
/.J. .. ,/~ ?/(/ ~.-:J..;>.....K. ,,....,__,,,_,,,_"'_,. ~"'r'---
7 WILLIN-1 STP"fORD 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
FOOTNOTE FOLLO\-JS 
-7--
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·FOOTNOTE: (Curtis v. Page - TCA 78-732) 
\ \ 
'\ ,, l. At the court's request, counsel for plaintiffs has 
\ 
prepared a proposed notice to the class of Medicaid re-
cipients which plaintiffs contend will be in compliance 
with federal regulations. Having reviewed this docwnent, 
copi~s.of which have been provided to defendant's counsel, 
the court concurs that the proposed notice would satisfy 
the requirements of 45 C.F.R. §205.10. Use of plaintiffs' 
proposed notice by defendant as a model for notice to the 
class would obviate further protracted litigation·on the 
·adequacy of notice. The clerk of the court is directed 
to f il~ and docket in the court record the letter from 
plaintiffs' counsel to which the proposed notice is at-
tached. 
The court wishes to emphasize that, in finding the 
March 1,1978 notice inadequate, no fault or bad faith on 
the part of defendant is implied. As is all too common 
with federal administrative regulations, 45 C.F.R. §205.10 
is f gir from free of ambiguity and contradiction. It is 
apparent from a reading of the Harch 1, 1978 notice, and 
the court so finds, that defendant has made a good faith 
effort to comply with the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 5205.10. 
-8-
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IN THE UNITED SfATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
GLORIA CAMPOS, et al. , 
Plaintiffs ORDER. 
and Civil No. C 79 0278 
Intervening Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ANTHONY MITCHELL, et al. , 
Defendants. 
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Def endan ts' cross .Motion for 
Surrunary Judgment and the Memoranda in suppo rt thereof and 
in opposition thereto filed by the respective parties, 
and it appearing to the Court that there exist no genuine 
issues of material fact as to the claims raised by Plaintiffs' 
Motion: 
IT rs HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. (a) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Sununary 
Judgment is partially granted, and Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied, insofar as federal Medicaid 
regulations 42 C.F.R. §431.12 and 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (4) 
required Defendants to consult with and allow the participation 
of a properly constituted State Medical Care Advisory Committee 
in the development of policy changes in the Utah Medicaid 
plan and to adequately noti f· : Medicaid recipients of intended 
reductions and terminations in services, including their 
rights to reques t a hearing and the circumstances under which 
services are continued and under which a hearing will be 
granted. 
(b) Hearings granted pursuant to this Order 
need only consider whether an individual's medical need 
is covered by the Utah Medicaid program. Hearings need 
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,t be granted to review the wisdom or propriety of 
.eductions or terminations in the program's optional services. 
2. Prior to continuing the reductions and terminations 
.ffective March 1, 1979, Defendants shall forthwith: 
(a) Give a properly constituted State Medical 
:are Advisory Conuni ttee a meaningful opportunity to conside r 
.ind conunent on the reductions and tcrmina tions; 
(b) Give proper notice in the form attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference to all members of the 
Haintiff class, by first class mail, of the reductions and 
terminations; 
(c) Advise recipients of all services that have 
been restored in accordance with the budget approved by 
the 1980 Utah Legislature; and 
(d) Further advise the Plaintiff class that, 
if they can show with documentation that they were billed for 
services reduced or terminated from March 1, 1979, until 
this subsequent notice, they may file a claim for reimbursement 
with the Division of Hea l th Care Financing and Standards. 
Defendants shall determine eligible claims and pay them 
~ the extent they can make funds available. 
3. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the 
issue of attorneys' fees and costs until further Order. 
DATED this ID day of ~ 1980. 
COPIES MAILED TO COUNSEL 
Anproved as to form 
and content: 
BRUCE JENKI S 
UNITED STA S D TRICT JUDGE 
. /);,__,,_v j.. '-A-lJ 1u.:iL 
MARY HOWARTH 
Attorney for Defendants 
~~-L / ,,f )re ;t/;~;:i!;--
( 
l~HN !1c.ALLISTER 
(/\ttorney for Defendants 
U7AH LE AL SERVICES, INC. 
By LUCY BILLINGS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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NO'I'ICE 
TO ALL MEDICAID RECIPIENTS 
As Medicaid recipients were notified last year, as 
of !iarch 1, 1979, some s pecific services in the Medicaid 
program were reduced, and some were eliminated. On March 
1.f}_, 1980, the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah ordered the Utah Department of Health to provide you 
this more adequate and updated notice of program changes. 
YOU MAY BE ELIGIBLE F.QR PAYMENT OF YOUR MEDICAL BILLS . 
Because the notice ?rovided last year may have 
been inadequate, if you were billed yourself for the period 
from March 1, 197 9 , un til you receive this notice, for any 
of the services under lined in this notice, you may be able 
to have them paid for, if money i s available. You will hav e 
to prove your claim, with a cancelled check, doctor's statement, 
or other means. If you believe you may be e ntitled to reim-
bursement, call the Medicaid office at 533-6571 or, if you 
are outside Salt Lake County, call 1-800-662-9651 by October l, 198 0 . 
T~e Medicaid office will process such claims 
like a hearing request. Payments wi 11 be made only if ( 1) 
the claim is found to be one that would have been paid i f 
no cutbacks had been made, and (2) mo ne y can be made available 
from state and.for federal sources to pay such cla ims. 
7~ese services were reduced or e liminated effective 
starting March 1, 1979, but were restored effective Februa r y 
4, 1980, as follows: 
(1) DENTAL CARE -
Dentures will be cove r ed . 
Othe r critical dental needs wi l l b e c overe d i f 
funding permits . 
All den tal care fo r chi l dre n u nder 21 has a lwa y s 
been covered. 
(2) EYEGLASSES -
These will be covered. 
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These services were reduced or eliminated effective 
starting ?1arch 1, 1979, and remain as follows: 
(1) DRUGS -
You may be prov ided a different brand or different 
looking product , but it will be the same medication. 
(2) CHIROPRA.CTORS' AN D NATUROPATHS' SERVICES -
Services prov i ded by chi r opractors and naturopaths 
are not covered. 
However, if you receive such se rvicGs fr om a 
ohysician they are c overed. 
(3) PSYCHOLOGISTS' SERVICES -
For more than 3 treatments to be covered, nrior 
approval is required. 
If a service requires prior approval this means your medical 
care provider must contact the Medicaid office f or a determination 
of whet:-ier the benefit you s eek wi 11 be covered. If your provider 
does not reauest orior aporoval, you may call the Medicaid 
office at 533-6571 or 1-800-662-9651 at any time. If the request 
is modified or rejected, you have the right to written 
notice, within 30 davs after the request , of the action, the reasons, 
and vour right to a hearing. 
( 4) ':'RAHSPORTATION -
BUS trans porta tion to obtain needed med ical care 
is covered by :ores e nting a TJT.A. ID Card, which is 
ava ilabl e upon reque st from your local Ass i stance 
Payments office. 
TAXI, rurnuCAR, or SERVICAR t r ansportation is covered for 
~andicapped pe rsons who re ceive a special transportation 
card through a reques t for orior aooroval as outlined 
above . 
MIBULANCE transportation rlue to an emergency 
is not limited. 
If you are not handicapped, but need Sl'.)ecial transportation (other 
~~ambulance transportation du e to an emergency), you must r equest 
orior aDproval yourself bv calling the !1edicaid o ffic e . 
Contrary to the notice provided in February, 1979, 
the following services were not reduced or terminated: 
(1) ELECTIVE PROCEDURES 
( 2) 1WRS ING HOME BED HOLD ING 
( 3) PHYSIC.Z\L THERAPY 
The reductions and eliminations of services were made according to 
fan intent statement a p proved by the 1979 Utah Legislature, based 
1 on ways to decrease ~edicaid costs wo rked out between the Department 
- 7.-
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and the Leg is la ture' s .7\ppropria tions Subcommittee on Social 
Services, and published in the Appropriations P.eport 19 7 9- 8 0, 
from the Office of the Le g islative Fiscal Analyst, at pag e 
302' 
HEARING RIGHTS 
You always have the right to r e quest a hearing 
on your eligibility f o r Me dicaid services, and you have the 
right to continued services un ti 1 a hearing decision is 
~de if you have been receiving services that are denied. 
Beyond eligibility facto . rs, a hearing will only consider 
whether your individual medical need is presently covered 
~ the program. You may also call the Medicaid office if 
you believe a provider has incorrectly determined that 
a service you need is not covered. In a ddition, you may 
request a hearing on reimbursement for services that you 
already received and you be liev e are covered. Hearings 
will not be granted, howe ver, to revi e w the wisdom or 
propriety of limitations in the program's optional services. 
:ior will the l!edicaid office review the J)rofessional judgment 
of providers not to perform particular services. 
If you have any questions about anything in this 
notice, call the .~1edicaid office at 533-6571 or 1-800-662-9651, 
your attorney, or any legal services office. 
Approved as ~o form and cont.en t: 
/ 
17?2ttt~Jk(~' [i(j 
.M ... l\lU HOW.lr'RTH 
Attorney for De fend a nts 
Ill /) / h / #'/~-4-----
,L..h .!~ r:> i!,_ ___ j_[_/L<. L;:;,e..fi-1 ·----
/ J,PHN McALLISTER 
(~ttorney for Defendants 
_,, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By LUCY BILLINGS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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